*You've got to give it all you can that first year. Doesn't matter what kind of majority you come in with. You've got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves.*

—LYNDON B. JOHNSON

# 3

# Lyndon B. Johnson

## *Legislative Leadership and a Credibility Gap*

ON MARCH 31, 1968, Lyndon Johnson (served 1963–1969) stunned a nation weary of the Vietnam War and urban unrest with this nationally televised announcement: "I shall not seek—nor will I accept—the nomination of my party for another term in this great office of all the people." [1] He only went public with his decision after Sen. Eugene McCarthy, D-Minn., made a surprisingly strong showing in the March 1968 New Hampshire primary. Just four years earlier Johnson had been widely praised as a masterful legislative leader and one of the truly great presidents of the twentieth century. In fact, 1964–1965 had produced by far the biggest outpouring of new legislation since FDR's first term. Then things fell apart. Johnson went from high-opportunity/high-achievement president to political villain in a few short years. Lady Bird Johnson pronounced her husband's White House years as "the best of times, the worst of times." Johnson's leadership skills—and his limitations—were an essential part of the story of this eventful period.

## Personal Characteristics

The lanky, six-foot five-inch Lyndon Baines Johnson (1908–1973) was a product of both Texas and Washington. He was raised in the Texas hill country west of Austin by a mother with high ambitions for her son and a father with a populist political orientation and a career that included

ranching, real estate, state lawmaking, and service in a low-paying state job. After Johnson graduated from a small, unaccredited high school, he spent a year in California and then attended Southwest Texas State Teachers College rather than the more prestigious University of Texas at Austin. In college he was a largely indifferent student, but he spent long hours talking with one of his political science professors. He also enjoyed campus politics, became an influential figure on campus while an aide in the president's office, and observed the state legislature in nearby Austin. Lyndon was a young man in a hurry as well; he graduated in only two and a half years. Before pursuing a life in politics, he became the only president after Herbert Hoover to teach in a secondary school—both in a poor rural school composed largely of Hispanic students and later in Houston. In these early years Johnson was highly active in local politics. He got his start in national politics by gaining a congressional staff position after working on a local campaign.[2]

### *Career Path*

Johnson had more extensive political experience in Washington than any other post-Hoover president. With the exception of the two years he spent as the Texas administrator for President Franklin Roosevelt's National Youth Administration, he held various positions on Capitol Hill from that of a staff aide beginning in late 1931 to Senate majority leader from 1955 to 1961, the year he became vice president. During those years Johnson showed not only intense ambition but also considerable skill in seeking out mentors who could both teach him the art of politics and help him to advance his career. That list included Sam Rayburn, D-Texas, who served as Speaker of the House on and off between 1940 and 1961; Sen. Richard Russell, D-Ga., the acknowledged dean of the southern senators; and to some degree President Roosevelt himself.

Lyndon's earliest days on the Hill found him working long days and nights as he quickly learned the ropes in the office of Rep. Richard Kleberg, D-Texas, and then often ran the place. All the while he was observing Roosevelt's early leadership of Congress with fascination. In 1934 he met and married Claudia "Lady Bird" Taylor, the daughter of a successful Texas farmer and merchant. In 1935, with the help of Sam Rayburn, Johnson was appointed as the nation's youngest state director of Roosevelt's newly created National Youth Administration.



When his local member of Congress died in 1937, Johnson rushed into an aggressive candidacy in which he literally talked himself to exhaustion but won the coveted House seat. LBJ was viewed as a "comer" by Roosevelt, and through the influence of both fellow Texan Rayburn and Roosevelt he gained important committee assignments. Frustrated, however, with the seniority system in the House he sought a Texas Senate seat unsuccessfully in a special election held in 1941. He was luckier in 1948, although he won by a narrow margin, earning him the nickname "Landslide Lyndon." The election results were challenged by his opponent.

In the 1930s LBJ had been a staunch New Dealer on economic issues, but in the 1940s he began to vote more conservatively as both Texas and the nation became less supportive of the New Deal agenda. Among other things, he went along with popular sentiment in Texas and voted for the 1947 Taft-Hartley Labor Act and against federal civil rights actions such as antilynching laws.

Johnson's Senate career reached a new height in 1953 when he became its surprisingly young minority leader; two years later he was selected majority leader. LBJ built that position into one of greater influence and generally has been regarded as one of the modern Senate's most effective party leaders. The techniques he used as majority leader resembled those he used so effectively later as president. For example, he prided himself on an extensive information system that included detailed knowledge of what the Republicans were up to. And from time to time he engineered vote trades by arranging aid for a given senator's state, but he preferred to find ways he could gain the needed vote without asking a senator to thwart strong constituency sentiment. Finally, Johnson built loyalty among junior members with good committee assignments, and he was a master at dealing with legislative procedures.[3]

LBJ's move to the presidency actually began with his belated bid for the party's nomination in 1960. But his efforts to capitalize on his Washington influence were no match for the strong primary performance by Sen. John Kennedy, D-Mass. After Kennedy turned to Johnson to take the second place on the ticket in an effort to shore up his support in the South, LBJ campaigned diligently in the fall election.

As vice president, Johnson was not a part of Kennedy's inner circle nor did Kennedy use Johnson in a major way in dealing with the Senate. He believed it would produce resentment from that chamber. The tragic events in Dallas on November 22, 1963, however, changed everything.

## What Manner of Man?

The drive for power that Johnson had displayed throughout his career was both intense and rooted in personal insecurity. He had virtually no hobbies other than politics and the pursuit of business deals that had made him a very wealthy man by the time he became president. His energy seemed boundless, yet at points he drove himself to the point of exhaustion. During his first weeks in the presidency, for example, he seldom slept more than three or four hours a night. His long-standing routine was to begin work about seven, take a nap about four, and then continue working well into the evening. Sixteen- to eighteen-hour days were not uncommon.

Johnson's insecurities often have been traced to early childhood experiences in which his mother, who was a descendent of a fairly prominent Texas family, sought to compensate for her own downward social mobility with her aspirations for Lyndon.[4] Apparently, her high aspirations, coupled with little expression of parental love, shaped both his insecurities and his intense desire to succeed. But whatever the precise causes, Johnson was a man with many resentments. His targets included those with a better education than he had had—including in particular the "Harvard crowd" around Kennedy—and a press corps he felt paid too much attention to his failings. Because of his frequent mood swings, some writers have concluded that he suffered from aspects of a manic-depressive personality.[5]

The president's relationships with other individuals were complex. He thoroughly enjoyed the process of manipulation and often was extremely effective in one-on-one situations as he combined his legendary arm-twisting with carefully reasoned arguments. He also enjoyed occasional vulgarity, as when he would comment to an aide who had just seen a leading senator, "Open your fly. The senator has your pecker in his pocket." Some young aides also were startled when he continued to dictate notes from a toilet seat. And he could be cruel, as when he forced Vice President Hubert Humphrey to shoot a deer on the LBJ Ranch specifically because he knew Humphrey would hate the act. Yet he often seemed to view staff as "family" and could, on occasion, be quite caring when they faced difficulties. Loyal staff aides learned to ignore his tirades, while some, such as Wilbur Cohen, simply concluded that it was interesting to work for a complex person. Top aide Joseph Califano captured his many dimensions when he wrote, "The LBJ I worked with was brave and brutal, compassionate and cruel, incredibly intelligent and infuriatingly insensitive, with a shrewd and uncanny instinct for the jugular of his allies and adversaries. He could be altruistic and petty, caring and crude, generous and petulant, bluntly honest and calculatingly devious—all within the same few minutes."[6]



Johnson possessed a very high degree of native intelligence. Although he had not attended a prestigious college and had little interest in books, his intelligence was apparent as he soaked up knowledge quickly. For example, as vice president he became quite knowledgeable about the technical aspects of space flight, and in his presidential years he grasped the complexities of economic policy from his economic advisers. His intelligence also was evident in his arguments with others. Sen. Harry Byrd Sr., D-Va., for example, observed that he had never won an argument with LBJ.

## Policy Views

Johnson, who found political ideologies too inflexible, was not a typical liberal. He seemed to have a love affair with economic growth but had little interest in redistributive policies that would aid the poor by increasing taxes on the wealthy. These ideas came together in 1964 as he promoted his War on Poverty along with a major tax cut. He also viewed labor unions skeptically, taking the view that strikes were too often a waste of resources. His close ties with the business community over the years—and his own investment successes—generated sympathy for its concerns.

LBJ did, however, support many liberal causes. Born into a family that periodically suffered economic difficulties in one of the nation's poorer states, Johnson identified easily with the view that government efforts could help people help themselves, and he showed genuine concern for the impoverished. In one poignant moment during his White House years he actually cried as he viewed the depression era poverty depicted in the movie *The Grapes of Wrath* based on John Steinbeck's novel. Perhaps reflecting his own days as a teacher, he also believed in the importance of education. In Johnson's encompassing view of his new programs, "government could directly or indirectly alleviate any distress."[7] Thus his vision of his "Great Society," while motivated by desires for personal greatness, was rooted in strong beliefs as well.

On racial issues, Johnson changed his views dramatically over the course of his career. In the mid-1950s, as he began thinking of a possible presidential bid, he moved away from a voting record on racial issues that paralleled that of other southern members of Congress. Yet by 1962 he

was advocating stronger steps than Kennedy wanted to take, and he increasingly saw civil rights issues in moral terms. In that switch he was influenced partly by personal events—such as when a black staff aide had difficulty finding "colored only" accommodations when driving back to Texas.

In broader terms, Johnson saw his domestic policies as part of a "consensus" in which all major segments of society would receive rewards. In some respects, this view resembled aspects of Roosevelt's "all class" coalition effort during 1933–1934. Johnson's thinking also reflected a concern for the concept of a national community as these policies were to come together. In a way, Johnson saw himself as a benevolent father to the nation.

## Challenges and Opportunities

Johnson's White House years found him enjoying both splendid opportunities and daunting challenges. In his first two years LBJ enjoyed a greater opportunity to achieve major domestic policy change than any post-Hoover president except Roosevelt. At the outset, his potential for influence was enhanced by a national sense that the components of Kennedy's domestic program not yet been passed should be enacted in the name of the martyred former president.

Johnson also benefited from having, in effect, two first years in office. In 1964 the first-year honeymoon effect enhanced his personal popularity, and with his landslide election win the same year he was able to argue credibly that he now had a mandate for the domestic programs he had been promoting. In addition, because he had an opportunity (which he capitalized on handsomely) to work on new proposals throughout 1964, he was able to move his program in Congress more quickly in 1965 than a president who had not enjoyed that additional time. In turn, the surge of Democratic strength in Congress not only suggested the existence of a mandate but, in more practical terms, provided a group of new Democratic members of Congress who were in large part strongly committed to the president's expansive policy agenda.

Two other factors also contributed to Johnson's high opportunity level. First, the lengthy list of programs that had been drawing increased support over the preceding five to ten years represented excellent "windows of opportunity" in that there was substantial agreement on the need for action and in some instances substantial agreement on the appropriate policy design.[8] Second, Johnson was aided by the general activism stirring in American society by 1964. Kennedy and Johnson may have helped to intensify those developments, but the forces of activism were growing nevertheless.



The economic forces that Johnson faced in the mid-1960s were the exact opposite of those Roosevelt faced in 1933. Rather than confronting a depression that would cause an apprehensive nation to look to the government for new policies, Johnson assumed office at a time when economic conditions had seldom been better. Economic growth between 1963 and 1966 produced a three-year peacetime growth record—6 percent in both 1965 and 1966.

In contrast to his unique early opportunities, Johnson's last three years in office saw an unprecedented decline. In Congress the Democrats lost forty-seven seats in the 1966 midterm elections (see Table 1–3). But this loss was only one indication of the basic changes in public attitudes that were occurring. One fundamental source of Johnson's eroding opportunities was the dramatic shift in racial conflicts from the southern states to the cities of the North. This shift began with rioting in Harlem in 1964 and burst dramatically into the national spotlight with the Watts riots in Los Angeles in August 1965. More and more whites had come to believe that efforts to address racial problems were moving too rapidly, and new, more militant civil rights leaders had emerged, often overshadowing the leaders with roots in the South such as the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. Johnson, then, faced a difficult dilemma: the actions proposed to address urban problems could easily be construed as inappropriate efforts to reward rioters. The timing of this shift in the public's attitudes toward racial issues is important because it came while Johnson was still quite popular and before the divisive issue of the Vietnam War began to have a profound impact on the nation's politics.

As for Vietnam, along with the challenge of addressing domestic policy demands, Johnson had to deal with the nation's commitment to that southeast Asian country.[9] The dilemma was acute. On the one hand, clear majorities in Congress, the public, and many foreign policy experts felt it was important that South Vietnam not fall under communist control.[10] Yet Johnson also faced a situation in which conventional air and land forces would prove ineffective in the face of a guerilla movement supported by a regime that was willing to sustain substantial losses. Johnson first hoped to avoid having the issue disrupt his pursuit of Great Society programs by sidestepping debate and carrying out his military buildup in ways that caused as little disruption as possible to American society. He

decided not to call up the nation's military reserves, for example, and relied instead on the young men supplied through the draft. Beginning in the spring of 1966, however, dissent to his Vietnam policies mounted and his two uniquely successful years dealing with Congress on domestic policy were followed by a presidency in increasing disarray. In the spring of 1968 the situation climaxed as a majority of citizens for the first time concluded that the U.S. commitment in Vietnam had been a mistake.

## Leadership Style

Johnson sought to model his leadership on his friend FDR. He often spoke of Roosevelt as "a second Daddy to me" and "a book to be studied, restudied, and reread."[11] Any president, in LBJ's view, needed to be the central figure in a political system in which Congress was often reactive. Whereas Truman and Eisenhower had concerns about Roosevelt's assertive effort to lead Congress, Johnson strongly believed that decisive leadership was essential and that Roosevelt's performance was the one to emulate—and hopefully surpass. He also strongly subscribed to the view that the president should speak for all individuals and interests.

### *The Advisory Process and Approach to Decision Making*

As an accidental president, Johnson faced the same task Harry Truman had confronted in 1945—cabinet and staff members would have to be changed, but gradually and while maintaining a public perception of continuity between the two presidencies. By virtually all accounts, Johnson handled the initial transition very well with his emphasis on reassurance and continuity.

Inevitably, key personnel did begin to change; some wished to leave and others bowed to Johnson's preferences. In the cabinet, Attorney General Robert Kennedy stayed until mid-1964, when he was replaced by the deputy attorney general, Nicholas Katzenbach. Other key cabinet officials with domestic policy responsibilities included Treasury Secretary Henry Fowler, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare John Gardner, Secretary of Agriculture Orville Freeman, and Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall.

The heart of Johnson's advisory process was at the staff level, where he modeled his system in part on FDR's staff operations.[12] At various times several different people fulfilled aspects of the chief of staff role, but Johnson was very much in charge of overall operations. Among other things, he recruited some prominent Texans, such as his own longtime aides Bill Moyers and Henry McPherson, both of whom had served in the Kennedy administration. Moyers served as deputy director of the Peace Corps and McPherson as deputy undersecretary of the army. Moyers, despite his youth, had risen rapidly in Johnson's eyes and was given a prominent role in the early months of the Johnson presidency.



With his staff in place, Johnson launched an unusually broad search for domestic policy ideas.[13] He encouraged Walter Heller, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, to expand the process he had instigated for developing proposals dealing with poverty. In July 1964 the president created a system of outside task forces that would seek ideas from a broad range of experts. These groups were to operate in secret and avoid weighing either budgetary concerns or political feasibility as they worked to develop the best possible proposals in each policy area. At the beginning, each task force was made up of about a dozen individuals, some drawn from outside government. About half were chosen for their academic credentials; the other slots were divided among business, labor, and other interest groups. Under Califano's direction, interagency task forces took on new importance as well. Presidential commissions also were established on occasion, such as the Kerner Commission on Civil Disorders in the wake of rioting in Detroit in 1967.

The task forces dealt with virtually every area of policy development in the Johnson administration. In 1964 those areas included agriculture, education, environmental pollution, health, income maintenance, metropolitan and urban problems, and transportation. As a testament to the relentlessness with which Johnson pursued his desires for new legislation, 145 task forces were convened during Johnson's five years in office.

The decision process that emerged was multifaceted. Some of the task forces, especially at the outset, largely refined ideas already debated in Congress. For example, Congress had been looking at the pros and cons of various Medicare proposals since the late 1950s. New ideas also emerged, including for additional health programs and for an innovative urban program known as Model Cities.[14]

Johnson usually paid considerable attention to issues of political feasibility. He phoned committee chairs frequently and read the opinion polls avidly. He also provided ample access for various interest groups of all persuasions as final proposals were being developed. In late 1964 the

negotiating process on federal aid to education produced such extensive agreement that congressional passage actually was surprisingly easy. In putting forth new legislation, LBJ often used his back channels with various friends from his lifetime in Washington. Although he usually stressed feasibility, he did on occasion put forward measures that faced an uncertain future. One of the more notable instances was his promotion of legislation addressing housing discrimination in 1966.

Because Johnson was a firm subscriber to the view that his popularity and clout would decline over time, he sought to move new proposals quickly. Moreover, because he believed that "consensus" could be achieved with programs that had some gains for virtually all Americans, he emphasized a broad range of new initiatives.

Johnson's search for ideas and the results that emerged have sometimes been criticized for a lack of new direction; he seemed better able to fine-tune ideas already on the legislative agenda. An analysis by Mark Peterson has provided some confirmation of this view. He found that many of LBJ's proposals already had been considered in Congress and were not highly innovative.[15] Johnson, however, did not come to power under the same conditions enjoyed by Roosevelt or Reagan—that is, as representatives of parties that had been out of power and as candidates oriented toward new approaches. Rather, Johnson was the head of a party that had been struggling to pass its existing agenda.[16]

### *Administrative Strategies*

President Johnson did not consistently engage in administrative issues—he had neither the time nor the interest—yet he did encourage members of his staff such as Joseph Califano to deal with policy implementation issues. The few formal reorganization proposals that did come to light rarely commanded his attention.[17] Although Johnson periodically would reach down into the bureaucracy and become engaged in a highly specific issue, his primary goal was to pass legislation; administrative bottlenecks could be dealt with later. In 1966, for example, he gained passage of a water act even though somewhat similar legislation passed in 1965 had not yet been implemented.

Not surprisingly, LBJ's administrative style created problems. The rapid emergence of new programs for states and urban areas led to considerable confusion, and some felt there was not sufficient follow-through



in the implementation of civil rights legislation. In his desire to move rapidly to wage a war on poverty, Johnson also sought to implement a system of community participation, which some critics found unwieldy and ineffective. By the end of the Johnson administration, it had become clear that administrative issues required greater attention.

### *Public Leadership*

Johnson was neither well prepared nor well equipped to deal with public leadership. His years in the Senate had not provided the skills he needed to make effective public addresses. As for the media, he had become accustomed to dealing with the often cooperative Texas press, but parsing with the more adversarial White House press corps would be another thing altogether. He could be highly persuasive in small groups, but his natural speaking style before large audiences included exaggerations and promises more befitting a speech at a local courthouse than a national address. In contrast to Kennedy who was at ease in dealing with television, Johnson continually experimented but frequently was dissatisfied with his results. On television he simply lacked the personal warmth and appeal of a Kennedy or an Eisenhower.

Yet with the aid of skilled speechwriters, and when speaking from the heart on some domestic topics, Johnson could be rather effective. His 1964 State of the Union address was rated better in substance than in style, but it generally received a favorable assessment. A commencement address delivered at the University of Michigan the same year and commonly known as the "Great Society Speech" was one of his more well-received efforts. Written by Richard Goodwin, who was following Johnson's instructions to avoid a laundry list of programs, the final result included lines such as: "We have the opportunity to move not only toward the rich society and the powerful society, but upward to the Great Society." Another oft-quoted line was: "The Great Society . . . demands an end to poverty and racial injustice, to which we are totally committed."[18] His early statements on civil rights also drew generally favorable reviews.

Public speaking became more difficult as Johnson became embroiled in the dual problems of conflict over the Vietnam War and urban unrest. On the problem of urban unrest, he was torn between the desire to express concern for the injustices contributing to it and the desire to avoid the appearance of being unresponsive to the calls for strong measures

to prevent further rioting. He often resorted to recitations of economic progress and the scope of new programs, but they did little to stifle the growing concern about the state of the nation.

Johnson's difficulties in relating to the public were intensified by his great difficulty in developing a persona beyond that of a deal-making Washington politician. A letter from former legislative aide and future staffer Henry McPherson to Press Secretary Bill Moyers after Johnson's first press conference points to some of those difficulties. He wrote:

> Obviously he started cold and ended warm. Throughout, however, there showed the public man's guarded apprehension before the press. In such interviews the observer gets the feeling that the entire exercise is meant not to convey information to the people, but to conceal as much as possible from prying newspapermen. Truth and real feelings only get out through the chinks in the wall. As a consequence people come to think of a man as "political" because he never says what he feels or what is apparent to everyone.[19]

But Johnson's approach to the public was handicapped by more than his technique; his tendency toward deception also contributed to his ineffectiveness. Lies about small matters, such as whether any of his relatives died in the Alamo, left many reporters and members of the public wondering whether he was trustworthy on larger issues. And his tendency to make bold claims for his new policies, including labeling his poverty effort a war, often produced skepticism when the policies produced less-than-advertised results. Various statements about Vietnam, starting with his 1964 campaign pledge to avoid American involvement, contributed as well to what many labeled his "credibility gap." For Mary Stuckey, credibility involves "the connection between word and action, a connection that, if broken, cannot be replaced. During Johnson's administration, that connection was visibly and clearly severed for the first time on the presidential level."[20]

The president also found it hard to deal with the media in part because of his desire to manipulate the press. Formal press conferences were held somewhat sporadically and took on a combative quality as Johnson's popularity fell. In one of his more vivid comments, he responded to a reporter, "Why would you ask the leader of the Western world a chickenshit question like that?"

Difficulties in relating to the public and the press were reflected in his popularity ratings. He was intensely interested in polling results and often would attribute a decline in approval ratings to various policies such



as those on civil rights or Vietnam. Yet he also contributed to his own problems with the persona he had created. He could not realistically present himself to a skeptical press as anything other than a Washington insider. Moreover, his poor press relations reduced his chances for positive personal stories.

## *Congressional Leadership*

Legislative leadership was a central dimension of Johnson's view of his presidency. He continued many of the practices he had used as majority leader, including carefully reading the *Congressional Record,* zealously pursuing information, paying careful attention to coalition possibilities, and pushing hard to get a key vote. While vote trades were considered periodically, the president also liked to use his extensive information about issues to push the merits of various proposals.

In the course of his attempts to persuade members of Congress, the president spent more time dealing with committee chairs than with rank and file members. Just as in his Senate days, Johnson went about gaining the support of individual legislators in many different ways—specific trades, or appeals to the public interest, or a carefully developed appeal. The manner in which he carefully built his relationship with Senate Republican minority leader Everett Dirksen of Illinois in a successful effort to enlist his support for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was simply one of the more widely noted instances in which Johnson's effort to garner votes was based on factors other than a direct bargain for something Dirksen desired.

On occasion Johnson would use public addresses to help spur passage of his legislation, but more often his primary role was playing the "inside game" of dealing with key committee chairs. In rallying public support, he felt more comfortable with efforts to mobilize interest groups and opinion leaders than with public addresses.

Although the White House had no formal office of public liaison, staffers promoted interest group activity heavily. They also called on opinion leaders, including key business figures, to solicit public endorsement of various legislative measures.

Finally, in his legislative strategies Johnson was committed to the importance of a fast start. As he said after he retired, "You've got to give it all you can that first year. Doesn't matter what kind of majority you come in with. You've got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves."[21] With his fast start he would es-

tablish some priorities, such as Medicare in 1965, but he was by no means reluctant to pursue a broad agenda. At the outset of his administration he seemed to think often of Roosevelt's legislative performance in his first two years in office and to pursue legislation with an eye toward rivaling—if not surpassing—FDR's accomplishments.

## Legislative Enactments

During Johnson's five years in the White House, the nation witnessed the most extensive outpouring of domestic legislation since Roosevelt's first term. Three landmark bills were enacted in 1964, followed by three more in 1965. Journalists wrote that Johnson had enacted the remaining components of the New Deal agenda in only eighteen months. The pace slowed after 1965, but Congress continued to pass major legislation, including a landmark housing measure in 1968. Johnson's leadership was a key factor in several of these developments.

### *1964: A Remarkable Beginning*

Johnson very definitely hit the ground running in 1964. In 1963, during his first weeks in office, he had provided the nation with the reassurance it needed, followed by a strong State of the Union address in January 1964 calling for swift enactment of stalled measures and a new "War on Poverty." The Eighty-eighth Congress (1963–1965), which had given President Kennedy considerable difficulty, responded to Johnson's leadership and the rising mood of activism in the country not only with three landmark measures but also with several major policies, including one targeting urban mass transit and one targeting the environment—a wilderness act setting up a system of lands free from intrusion. To passage of the War on Poverty program, a substantial tax cut, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Johnson applied different styles of presidential leadership.

*Economic Opportunity Act.* Johnson exhibited his broadest range of influences when he pushed adoption of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. This measure was promoted as the president's War on Poverty, but ultimately other efforts within his overall Great Society program would have more central roles in the push to reduce poverty. The initial appropriation for the "war" was $800 million; by 1968–1969 it had risen to $1.7 billion.



The action began on Johnson's first day in the White House. President Kennedy had asked Walter Heller, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, to develop a poverty proposal for 1964, but he had given him little specific guidance. Johnson gave Heller strong encouragement with the comment, "That's my kind of program. It will really help people." A frenzied planning process ensued, with various agencies trying to promote their programs among the many ideas being considered. Johnson devoured lengthy proposals at his Texas ranch over the Christmas holidays. Kennedy brother-in-law Sargent Shriver, who had headed JFK's Peace Corps, took over development of the final proposal and later became head of the new Office of Economic Opportunity.

Broadly, the proposal emphasized creating job opportunities and services in poverty areas rather than supporting incomes. One important idea, borrowed from recent experiments by the Ford Foundation, was local participation in the design of needed services. As finally passed, the Economic Opportunity Act called for the establishment of Community Action Programs (CAPS) which would determine the need for a variety of local service programs.

The act included other programs as well. A Job Corps program would relocate youth in residential centers and train them. A volunteer program, known as Volunteers in Service to America (VISTA), was envisioned, along with a legal services program for the poor, neighborhood health centers, and a preschool program called Head Start.

Passage of this legislation was a testament to Johnson's political skills.[22] After encouraging a bold planning process, he highlighted the measure in his State of the Union address, proclaiming "an unconditional war on poverty in America" and referred frequently to the War on Poverty in his daily remarks. He also highlighted submission of his program to Congress in March with a special one-hour television interview carried by all three networks. Finally, virtually all segments of American society received calls and letters in a campaign to develop expressions of support. The administration enlisted not just antipoverty volunteers and minorities, but also prominent educators such as university presidents, heads of various religious organizations such as the National Council of Churches, corporate and labor leaders, and state and local officials. In April, Johnson, sensing a tough fight in Congress, decided to pursue public support more directly by using his first trip as president (to Appalachia) to dramatize the nation's poverty problem. He also called legislators whose support was identified as uncertain. When the bill passed in the House by a larger-than-expected

margin of 226–184, veteran observers were amazed. House majority leader Carl Albert, D-Okla., reportedly told the president, "I can't figure out . . . how in the world we ever got this through."

*Tax Cut Legislation.* Johnson used very different tactics to promote passage of the tax cut President Kennedy had proposed in 1963.[23] Kennedy had called for reductions in every tax bracket with total reductions of $11 billion for individuals and $2.6 billion for corporations. After difficulties and amendments, the measure passed in the House before Kennedy's death, and now Johnson had to ensure its passage by the Senate.

Over lunch with Sen. Harry Byrd, Johnson struck a deal in which Byrd promised rapid action on the legislation and the new president promised to cut the size of the proposed deficit in his new budget to half of the $10 billion originally planned by Kennedy. With his typical delight in secrecy and surprise, LBJ then gave the press the impression that it would be impossible to keep the new budget under $100 billion even as he was hard at work producing a lower figure. He kept his side of the agreement with a proposal that cut Kennedy's proposed deficit by almost $5 billion. Commenting later on his efforts to achieve the reduction, Johnson said, "I worked as hard on that budget as I have ever worked on anything."[24] The size of the proposed tax cut was reduced slightly as well. In so doing, he had sent a message that deficits would be watched closely, thereby garnering support for his tax cut from the more conservative members of Congress. In the end, then, approval of the tax cut came easily, and Johnson was able to sign this landmark measure on February 26, 1964.

*Civil Rights Act.* The most historic action in 1964 came with passage of a civil rights bill. During the last six months of his life Kennedy had responded to the often violent civil rights demonstrations in Birmingham, Alabama, with new urgency and by submitting a specific legislative proposal that, among other things, sought to end discrimination in public accommodations such as restaurants, hotels, and transportation. Other provisions called for strengthening voters' rights. At the time of his death, Kennedy's measure had been making progress in the House, but it faced an uncertain future.

Johnson took over leadership of the civil rights bill with considerable intensity and a very distinct strategy. Public support for the bill had increased in the wake of Kennedy's assassination, also spurred perhaps by the public activism that seemed to be emerging. In the House, supporters



of the bill overcame southern resistance through the committee system, and the Civil Rights Act passed on February 10 by a vote of 290–130. It then faced deliberation in the Senate.

A keen knowledge of the Senate was crucial as Johnson developed his strategies. One key step was to indicate to Sen. Richard Russell, D-Ga., leader of the southern contingent, that he would not accept a significant compromise on the proposed legislation. Sensing that he was better off working behind the scenes, Johnson dealt closely with Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) on legislative strategies. Since the support of Republicans was necessary to break a filibuster, Humphrey was instructed to work closely with the Republican minority leader, Everett Dirksen. Johnson also had several conversations with Dirksen about the issue. As the filibuster began, Humphrey successfully orchestrated an effort by supporters of the legislation to gradually wear down the southern Democrats. Dirksen then brought additional Republicans into the supporters' camp, and the filibuster was broken.

The historic Civil Rights Act of 1964 owed its passage to many factors. Civil rights protests, rather than presidential leadership, had put the issue on the public's front burner by the spring of 1963. Growing public support also was a factor, especially among whites outside the South. President Kennedy's actions beginning in June 1963 and the actions of key legislators such as Senators Humphrey and Dirksen made a significant contribution as well. Finally, President Johnson contributed to the act's passage by refusing to bargain with the southerners and by encouraging the legislative strategies that ultimately produced the necessary Republican votes.

While the measures described here gained congressional passage rather easily, some stalled in 1964, such as the Medicare program of health insurance for the elderly and federal aid to education. President Johnson, however, was not entirely sorry to have Medicare still on the table; it would provide a good campaign issue for the fall election. The election, though, was his for the taking. After his decisive win in 1964 and the addition of thirty-seven Democrats to the House, the scene was set for another highly prolific period of congressional action.

### *The Eighty-ninth Congress: A Flood of New Legislation*

The Eighty-ninth Congress (1965–1967) produced an extraordinary flow of legislation, including three landmark measures in 1965—Medicare,

federal aid to education, and the Voting Rights Act—and a steady pace of major enactments, including an innovative Model Cities program in 1966 and several significant environmental measures. President Johnson did have some failures, however. One was home rule for the District of Columbia; another was a labor-endorsed measure that would have expanded the opportunity for unions to acquire members by eliminating state right-to-work laws. Nevertheless, Johnson enlisted a variety of strategies in promoting an unusually successful legislative agenda.

*Medicare.* By 1965 the time for enacting health insurance for the elderly had arrived.[25] There was strong public support, and, as noted, Johnson had made Medicare a major issue in the 1964 campaign. The remaining stumbling block appeared to be the resistance of congressional committee chairs. Johnson and the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Wilbur Mills, ultimately became the key figures as Congress debated a broader plan of health coverage than was originally envisioned.

Johnson contributed to the passage of Medicare in several ways. First, he used a combination of the findings of an advisory panel, staff work by Wilbur Cohen, under secretary of health, education, and welfare, and the contributions of Nelson Cruikshank, representing the AFL-CIO, to expand the original legislation. At this juncture, a fateful decision was made: Johnson's planners decided not to incur the wrath of the American Medical Association (AMA) over fee structures; under Medicare, the usual and customary fees could be charged. Second, Johnson gave the bill added importance by touting it in his State of the Union address and then having it symbolically designated the first bill to be considered by both houses of the new Congress. Third, in a classic display of his ability to manipulate an individual legislator, LBJ confronted Senator Byrd's reluctance to report out the bill by inviting him to the White House and, to Byrd's surprise, arranging for television cameras to be present as he left the executive mansion. The startled senator, when asked on camera about the bill, indicated somewhat reluctantly that his committee would report it out. Finally, once the legislation had been passed, Johnson shrewdly promoted the program with a group of AMA leaders, thereby helping to achieve smooth implementation of the new measure.

*Federal Aid to Education.* Before 1965 federal aid to education (elementary and secondary) had been debated often but never enacted. In



1965, however, both changing conditions and presidential strategies contributed to swift passage. The most important condition that changed was southern resistance to the legislation. Southerners, who had wanted aid for segregated schools, saw their bargaining position crumble with passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In addition, just like in 1933 for agricultural interests, the lobbying groups that had been fighting over the issue for years seemed more willing to compromise.

President Johnson had made the education issue a priority in the fall campaign, and he wanted to act quickly in 1965 before opposition could form to a new proposal.[26] He began by appointing, without announcement, a presidential task force, headed by John Gardner, president of the Carnegie Corporation (and later LBJ's secretary of health, education, and welfare). The task force proved to be one of Johnson's most successful. It met in secret and consulted behind the scenes with key groups such as the monsignors of the Catholic Church, Jewish organizations, southern leaders, and the various education lobbies. Thus through selective intervention without publicity, the executive branch was able to foster a climate of learning and accommodation between the proponents and opponents of general aid to education.[27]

*Voting Rights Act.* In 1965 pressures for legislation on voting rights mounted when it became apparent that the voting rights provisions contained in the 1964 Civil Rights Act could not be easily implemented in some areas of staunch resistance. The issue was dramatized when the Reverend Martin Luther King Jr. led protests in Selma, Alabama, in March. Like Birmingham two years earlier, Selma was chosen because it was a tough case. Blacks were still being denied the right to vote, and other aspects of segregation were still being practiced despite the provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Marches and protests brought the expected rough handling and jailings. Johnson federalized the Alabama National Guard to keep order, and television coverage helped intensify nationwide support for additional legislation.

The Johnson administration, which had been considering additional voting rights legislation before the Selma disturbances, now decided to act. The key provision of the new legislation was a trigger mechanism that would use low minority voter registration as a basis for appointing federal voting registrars. Once the bill had been drafted, Johnson met with the leaders of both parties to discuss the next steps. They encouraged the president to make a national address, which he did—but from Capitol

Hill. In that appeal for support he placed the issue in historic terms as he said in part, "I speak tonight for the dignity of man and the destiny of democracy. . . . So it was at Lexington and Concord. So it was a century ago at Appomattox. So it was last week in Selma, Alabama."[28] The public found it one of the most moving and eloquent speeches of his career.[29]

*Environmental Measures and Model Cities.* Environmental measures also began to emerge. In October 1965, with strong leadership from Sen. Edmund Muskie, D-Maine, Congress set auto emission standards for automobiles. The Johnson administration was more directly involved in passage the same year of the Highway Beautification Act, a cause promoted actively by Lady Bird Johnson.

The Model Cities legislation passed in 1966 had emerged from one of the 1965 task forces.[30] It was developed as a complement to the Community Action Programs Johnson had instigated as part of the War on Poverty and was to be the showpiece of the new Department of Housing and Urban Development. The stated goal of the legislation was to improve the quality of urban life. The main weapon was to be federal block grants that would cover 80 percent of the costs of projects such as low and moderate-income housing, health care, crime prevention, and even recreation. Any city could vie for inclusion in the program, but only 60–70 would be chosen. Interestingly, the Model Cities measure was first labeled a "demonstration" cities program, but, in the wake of urban rioting and demonstrations, its name was changed and it became a more central element in Johnson's urban program.

LBJ found it difficult to promote passage of this legislation in a Congress that was increasingly reflecting voter unease about the direction of his programs. Some opponents of the bill were arguing openly that it simply rewarded those protesters who were burning down the nation's cities. In the face of resistance, industry, labor, civil rights, and religious groups undertook a massive lobbying campaign. Twenty-two top business officials, including Henry Ford II and David Rockefeller, sent telegrams of support. Johnson and several top aides, together with future housing and urban development secretary Robert Weaver (the nation's first black cabinet member), sought legislative support. Administration supporters on key committees were strongly committed to the bill. When the measure finally reached the House floor, Johnson was able to hold together most of his northern Democratic supporters, and the measure passed by a majority of 178–141. Senate passage came more easily, and another Great Society experiment was launched.



### *The Ninetieth Congress: Johnson Keeps Trying*

As the Eighty-ninth Congress became the Ninetieth Congress (1967–1969) Johnson never stopped trying to promote his domestic agenda. During his last two years in office he faced a sharply reduced Democratic majority in the House with the loss of forty-seven seats in the midterm election and growing national frustration over urban rioting and the war in Vietnam (see Table 1–3). Yet task forces kept turning out new proposals, and Johnson kept seeking various opportunities for additional legislative action. Successes, however, became more elusive as the president found his window of opportunity closing. Some environmental and consumer measures were passed, in part because of strong pressure within Congress. And an administration proposal for increases in Social Security benefits also received congressional approval, in part because of the intense efforts by Johnson's veteran legislative strategist, Wilbur Cohen.

The biggest events of the last two years were passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 targeting housing discrimination and the belated effort to raise taxes. The open occupancy legislation addressing discrimination in housing sales and apartment rentals was not the first Johnson administration proposal in this area. The Senate had killed a similar proposal in 1966 with a filibuster, and another bill was buried in committee in 1967. A like fate was predicted in 1968 when similar legislation was introduced for a third time. The situation, however, had changed. The tireless advocacy by the NAACP's Clarence Mitchell on the part of the black community helped. Senator Dirksen then switched his position, which was critical to Senate passage. With Dirksen in the aye column for the first time, Democrats were able to garner enough Republican votes to break a filibuster, and the measure passed.

House action occurred in the midst of the widespread urban rioting that followed the April 1968 assassination of Martin Luther King Jr. Sections of the nation's capital erupted in flames. Before King's assassination, supporters had been worried about the bill's prospects. Members of the House, looking at an election in the fall, were highly sensitive to the public opposition. This issue was especially difficult for northern Democrats who represented districts in which some whites were deeply concerned about how the legislation might affect the composition of their neighborhoods. At the same time, the measure had to survive the House Rules Committee, which often had sought to kill civil rights legislation.

After the King assassination Johnson again urged members of the House Judiciary Committee to act on the legislation. With some members

concluding that a dramatic step would be helpful and amid strong lobbying by many different groups, the committee reported out the Senate bill intact and it went to the House floor. The full House passed the legislation within twenty-four hours.

### *Johnson and Congress*

It is not easy to determine just how much credit Johnson deserves for the legislative outpouring that occurred during his years in the White House. Some statistical studies of a large group of measures have had little success in isolating a significant influence stemming from presidential skill. Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher, for example, concluded that Johnson won about 5.5 percent more often than might be expected from the nature of the underlying coalition strength in the House, but about 3.2 percent less often in the Senate.[31] Mark Peterson found that Johnson facilitated the large amount of legislation that emerged by not squandering his opportunities.[32]

Favorable circumstances also helped Johnson enormously. His legislative skills would not have produced a comparable outpouring of legislation had he held office in 1961. Yet he made significant contributions to passage of some landmark measures, including his uncompromising stance on the 1964 Civil Rights bill and the very president-centered process that led to enactment of the War on Poverty. Strategies and tactics, in short, can make a difference. Johnson made the most of his opportunities and served as a facilitator during a period of strongly desired action on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue.

## An Assessment

The Johnson years produced fundamental changes in American life. The most far-reaching change was in the position of blacks in American society. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended segregation in public facilities such as restaurants and transportation systems, in theory at least, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 dramatically increased the availability and use of the right to vote. In Selma, Alabama, over 50 percent of blacks were registered to vote four years after the protests had begun, and increases in some areas of Mississippi were even more dramatic. While not producing as dramatic a change, the Open Housing Act of 1968 offered blacks greater home buying opportunities.

Another fundamental change was the expansion of access to health



care for the elderly and segments of the poor along with some change in the organization of the health care system. Medicare, by addressing a very real health insurance need for the elderly, proved to be highly popular. It also contributed to the increase in life expectancy Johnson had hoped for in 1965. Unfortunately, the program, which initially paid all "usual and customary fees" coupled with the costs of expanded longevity, became increasingly expensive. Medicaid provided valuable coverage for some of the nation's poor, but it was continually affected by tensions between Washington and the states and problems of administrative complexity.

The federal aid to education program paid out significant funds initially, but the compromise formula used to achieve passage reduced the amount of targeting possible. As funding declined, the federal government once again had a very small role by the 1990s, as both authority and funding responsibilities shifted to the states. The Johnson era environmental policies had some initial impacts, but the Nixon years, when interest in environmental issues soared, produced stronger efforts.

Johnson's economic policy legacies were mixed. At first it appeared that the "golden era of the economist" with its tax cuts had ushered in a new ability to manage economic growth with fiscal policy tools. Growth was indeed substantial, and unemployment was low. But as Johnson attempted to fund both guns (Vietnam) and butter (the Great Society) the burden on the economy caused a downturn in a variety of economic indicators.

Many assessments of Johnson's War on Poverty have concluded that "poverty won." But this is a misleading interpretation of a complex set of relationships. If one looks simply at the portion of the population living below the poverty line, a dramatic improvement occurred—from 20 percent in 1963 to 12 percent in 1968. This decline in the number of poor was the result in part of the tight labor market during those years, which has been variously attributed to the growth created by the tax cut and the additional military spending incurred by the onset of the Vietnam War. The decline in poverty among the elderly can be traced in part to the impact of Medicare beginning in 1966. Later, when Medicare assistance for health costs was combined with the substantial rise in Social Security benefits in the 1970s, the number of poor elderly declined significantly.

The performance of programs specifically included in Johnson's War on Poverty is more debatable. Their potential impact was muted in part by the military spending that prevented Johnson from increasing outlays for his most effective programs in 1966. Ultimately, then, only modest resources were committed to those programs. Food stamps and the earned

income tax credit, while not receiving much public attention during Johnson's time in office, assumed higher profiles in later years. In addition, Head Start showed positive results and found lasting interest and support well into the 1990s.

Overall, Johnson's performance in office revealed both impressive talent and glaring weaknesses. On the plus side, Johnson often built coalitions that were, according to one legislative aide, designed to be razor thin to get the most in a legislative package. His intense interest in seizing opportunities was evident not only during the good times of 1964–1965, but also in 1968, when, among conflicts abroad and conflicts at home, he successfully seized the opportunity to pursue open housing legislation. Moreover, Johnson's use of his task forces to generate legislative proposals was, arguably, one of the more successful presidential efforts of that type.

Thus when Johnson's performance is measured in terms of his ability to use his high opportunity level in 1964–1965, he warrants high marks. In terms of getting the most from situations, a recent assessment by former Sen. Eugene McCarthy seems most perceptive. He concluded: "Johnson could get what there was in a situation, but not more." [33]

On the minus side, Johnson played an often inept public role in trying to help the country move beyond his "politics of the best possible coalition." Between his initial staunch espousing of the case for civil rights and his strong speech on voting rights in 1965, he was at points quite effective. But when faced with the difficult issues arising from urban riots, his persona as a legislative bargainer and the sense that he was not entirely trustworthy reduced the measure of effectiveness a president might have had in that situation. A slave to his own frenetic pace and desire to pile policy on policy, Johnson sometimes lost sight of his goal—the improvement of the American community. Passing legislation replaced evaluation of where the country was going and what the implications of his policies might entail. More generally, his continual quantitative emphasis on what his administration had done to increase material goods in American society and his ongoing quest for new government programs simply failed to satisfy a nation that desired both a sense of direction and a measure of reassurance about the direction of its domestic policies and its ability to confront difficult problems.

At the same time, his desire to produce a "happy consensus" around his Great Society was a failure. Rather than acquiring the happy consensus and public admiration he craved, Johnson found himself on the receiving end of criticism from all directions. One indication of his sense of failure



was the direction his life took after leaving the presidency. He returned to his Texas ranch and remained almost totally removed from public affairs until his death in 1973.

As a skilled politician, Johnson also must have realized that the rupture in the Democratic Party coalition that accompanied Richard Nixon's 1968 defeat of Hubert Humphrey was widely viewed as a repudiation of his dreams of a Great Society. In the short run, Nixon would be in a position to push for curtailment of many of Johnson's programs. More fundamentally, however, the divisions in a coalition that had triumphed in 1964 raised difficult issues. Could the Democratic Party, especially in the South, continue to sustain white support in the face of new (but not a voting majority) participation by blacks? In turn, could the party bring back those segments of the New Deal coalition such as Catholics and union members who had been frustrated not only with Johnson's Vietnam policies, but also with the urban upheavals the nation had undergone during his years in office?

While these questions could only be answered in time, several conclusions about Johnson's leadership stood out. He was a president who really did care deeply about the programs he was promoting, and he had impressive political skills, which he used to move his legislative agenda. Yet his strategy of seeking to pursue "something for everyone" was a painfully inadequate vision for a nation going through a period of rapid social change.

## Notes

1. Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963–1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 429.

2. On Johnson's background, see in particular Robert Dallek, *Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908–1960* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); and Paul Conklin, *Big Daddy from the Pedernales: Lyndon B. Johnson* (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1986).

3. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, *Lyndon Baines Johnson: The Exercise of Power* (New York: New American Library, 1966).

4. James David Barber, *Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); and Doris Kearns Goodwin, *Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976).

5. John R. Bumgarner, *The Health of the Presidents: The 41 United States Presidents through 1993 from a Physician's Pointe of View* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1993).

6. Joseph A. Califano, *The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 10.
7. Conklin, *Big Daddy from the Pedernales,* 193.
8. James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1968).
9. David M. Barrett, *Uncertain Warriors: Lyndon Johnson and His Vietnam Advisers* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993), chap. 1.
10. Michael P. Sullivan, *The Vietnam War: A Study in the Making of American Policy* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1985), 112.
11. Stephen Hess, *Organizing the Presidency,* rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1988), 94.
12. Ibid., chap. 7.
13. Charles E. Walcott and Karen M. Hult, *Governing the White House: From Hoover through LBJ* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 152–153.
14. Emmett S. Redford and Richard T. McCulley, *White House Operations: The Johnson Presidency* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986).
15. Mark A. Peterson, *Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), 243.
16. This major distinction between Johnson's circumstances and those of Roosevelt and Reagan is drawn from Stephen Skowronek, *The Politics Presidents Make* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).
17. Marlan Blissett, "Untangling the Mess: The Administrative Legacy of Lyndon Johnson," in *Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses of Power,* ed. Bernard J. Firestone and Robert C. Vogt (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988), chap. 4.
18. Irving Bernstein, *Guns or Butter: The Presidency of Lyndon Johnson* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 132.
19. Letter to Bill Moyers from Henry McPherson, March 19, 1964, special file, public relations, 372, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas.
20. Mary E. Stuckey, *The President as Interpreter-in-Chief* (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1991), 78.
21. Quoted in Hess, *Organizing the Presidency,* 22.
22. Barbara Kellerman, *The Political Presidency: The Practice of Leadership* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), chap. 7.
23. Phillip M. Simpson, "Lyndon B. Johnson and the 1964–1968 Revenue Acts," in Firestone and Vogt, *Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses of Power,* chap. 13.
24. Johnson, *Vantage Point,* 36.
25. Sheri I. David, *With Dignity: The Search for Medicare and Medicaid* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995); and Theodore R. Marmor, *The Politics of Medicare* (New York: Aldine Publishing, 1973).
26. Bernstein, *Guns or Butter,* chap. 7.
27. Michael R. Reople and Lance W. Bardsley, "Strategies for Governance: Domestic Policy Making in the Johnson Administration," in Firestone and Vogt, *Lyndon Baines Johnson and the Uses of Power,* 21.



28. Johnson, *Vantage Point,* 165.
29. Conklin, *Big Daddy from the Pedernales,* 216.
30. Bernstein, *Guns or Butter,* chap. 18.
31. Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher, *The President in the Legislative Arena* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 206.
32. Peterson, *Legislating Together,* 244–246.
33. Eugene McCarthy, remarks at a meeting of the Town Hall of Los Angeles, June 14, 1995.

CQ Press
A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc.
1414 22nd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

(202) 822-1475; (800) 638-1710

www.cqpress.com

Copyright © 2000 by Congressional Quarterly Inc.

Book design: Dennis Anderson

Cover: Ed Atkeson

Printed and bound in the United States of America

04 03 02 01 00 5 4 3 2 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Lammers, William W.
The presidency and domestic policy : comparing leadership styles, FDR to Clinton / William W. Lammers, Michael A. Genovese
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 1-56802-124-0 (paper).—ISBN 1-56802-125-9 (hard)
1. Presidents—United States—History—20th century. 2. Political leadership—United States—History—20th century. 3. United States—Politics and government—1933–1945. 4. United States—Politics and government—1945–1989. 5. United States—Politics and government—1989– I. Genovese, Michael A. II. Title.
JK511.L35 2000
352.2'234'0973—dc21

99-088686

# The Presidency and Domestic Policy

## *Comparing Leadership Styles, FDR to Clinton*

William W. Lammers
*and*
Michael A. Genovese

A Division of Congressional Quarterly Inc.
*Washington, D.C.*